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LIFE AND DEATH DECISIONS: A REPLY
TO JUDGE PECCARELLI
IRWIN

I.
Jane Doe is not dying

R. KRAMER*

INTRODUCTION
. . .

at least, not anytime soon. With the

aid of a respirator, a feeding tube and an interwoven network of
other life-support systems, her doctors believe that she could linger
for many years. But, while these medical experts are confident that
Jane has many years of "life" ahead of her, they express grave reservations about the quality of this life. According to their diagnosis,
Jane is in a "persistent vegetative state" - a permanent coma from
which she has virtually no chance of ever regaining consciousness or
normal mental functioning. In all likelihood, Jane will live out the
remainder of her years in a lonely, solemn hospital room where she
will exist only by the grace of modern medical technology.
Though the complex network of tubes and machines succeed in
maintaining her basic bodily functions, it will never restore the life
that Jane enjoyed before the sudden accident which landed her in
the hospital bed that has become her home. Gone are the friends,
the career, the social gatherings and other amenities that, for many,
make life worth living. All that remain are nurses and hospital
orderlies taking periodic vital signs and changing I.V. bags, doctors
making daily rounds, and a heartbroken family that faces a pathetic
bedside vigil for many years to come.
After waiting two years for a miracle that has yet to occur,
Jane's family now seeks an end to this seemingly interminable tragedy. Their prayers unanswered, Jane's parents have turned to more
fallible, mortal authorities. As legal guardians for their daughter,
they have asked the court for an order allowing nature to take its
course: an order that, in their words, would allow Jane to "die with
dignity." In short, Jane's parents have sought the court's permission
to disconnect her life-support systems and feeding tubes-an action
that would lead inevitably to Jane's death.
* Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland. 1990-91 Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow
and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago School of Law. B.A., 1984, Towson
State University; J.D., 1987, University of Maryland; LL.M., 1989, Columbia
University.
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Despite hours of heart-rending testimony by close relatives,
friends, clergymen and physicians, Jane's parents have only succeeded in winning the court's sympathy. Armed with a copy of
Judge Anthony M. Peccarelli's latest law review article,' the court
explains that Jane's parents have presented it with a "moral dilemma" that it is incapable of resolving. Borrowing Judge Peccarelli's words, the court states that, "[in the absence of a legislatively expressed public policy, . . . the courts lack a justiciable issue

to consider and to decide the moral and social issues surrounding
the withholding and withdrawal of [life-prolonging treatment]."'
Like Judge Peccarelli, the court rejects prior judicial decisions
in this area and believes that following these misguided approaches
would exceed the proper role of the judicial branch: "It is only when
the legislative and executive branches of our government act that
the judiciary can make a determination, and resolve the ambiguity
of the competing interests."3 Accordingly, while the court sympathizes with Jane and her parents, it holds that they must await action by the state legislature before their personal dilemma can be
addressed.
This hypothetical decision, like the real law review article that
inspired it, illustrates the reluctance of certain members of the judiciary to confront such difficult life and death decisions. Similar to
Judge Peccarelli, these jurists seek to shift the burdens of this intractable dilemma to the legislature which, with the passage of a single statute, can presumably end all confusion and relieve them of
their judicial discomfort. Yet, while this discomfort is understandable,4 it does not warrant the wholesale abdication of judicial respon1. Peccarelli, A Moral Dilemma: The Role of Judicial Intervention in Withholding or Withdrawing Nutrition and Hydration, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 537
(1990).
2. Id. While Judge Peccarelli appears to limit his discussion to the withdrawal
of nutrition and hydration, "[a]rtificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished from
other forms of medical treatment." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110
S. Ct. 2841, 2857 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Like Justice O'Connor, Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun believe that "[nlo material distinction can be
drawn between . . .artificial nutrition and hydration and any other medical treatment. The artificial delivery of nutrition and hydration is undoubtedly medical treatment." Id. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). In fact, only one court
in the nation has ever attempted to draw such a distinction. See Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d 408, 423 (Mo. 1988), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); see also Delio v. Westchester
County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 19, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 689 (1987) (review of
decisions in other jurisdictions did not reveal a single case distinguishing between
procedures providing for nutrition and hydration and any other life-sustaining procedure). Since there does not appear to be any rational basis for such a distinction, this
Reply will treat the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration like the termination of any
other form of life-sustaining treatment.
3. Peccarelli, supra note 1, at 567.
4. As one commentator has aptly observed, "Courts are understandably uncom-
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sibilities advocated by Judge Peccarelli.
Though Judge Peccarelli suggests otherwise, legislation is not
the miracle cure for this judicial ailment, for this is an area in which
there are no perfect answers, no perfect decisions and no perfect
decisionmakers. "The question of whether a man should live or die
is ultimately not susceptible to a 'right' or 'wrong' answer, but an
answer must nonetheless be given." 5 Although judges are not perfect, they may be the best society has to answer this difficult question. As this Reply demonstrates, judges have for years done an outstanding job of decisionmaking in this difficult area' and have made
these decisions through a process that is far superior to that used by
politicians sitting in the legislature. 7 Thus, contrary to Judge Peccarelli's conclusions, this author concludes that judges can do more
good for society and for incapacitated patients by confronting difficult life and death decisions than they can by shifting their responsibilities to another branch of government.'

II. THE

QUALITY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING IN RIGHT TO DIE
CASES

Contrary to Judge Peccarelli's claims, his brethren have done an
exemplary job of decisionmaking in this troublesome area. In fact,
were it not for members of the judiciary, there would not be a "right
to die" at all. As early as 1891, the United States Supreme Court
laid the foundation for such a right when it observed that "no right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."9 In 1914, Justice Cardozo elaborated on this right in an early medical malpractice
case by reaffirming an individual's right to refuse surgery.10 According to Justice Cardozo, "every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body, and a surgeon who performs an operation without his pafortable with this process; they prefer, whenever possible, to avoid responsibility for
such decisions." Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the Dangerous Claim that Others
Can Exercise An Incapacitated Patient's Right to Die, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 389, 395
(1989) (footnote omitted).
5. Kindregan, The Court as Forum for Life and Death Decisions: Reflections
on Procedures for Substituted Consent, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 919, 920 (1977).
6. See infra notes 9-35 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 36-62 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
9. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
10. -Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914), rev'd on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
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tient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in
damages.""1
As medical technology grew, courts responded by expanding the
common law to provide needed protection from the added intrusions
accompanying newer methods of treatment. 2 With the invention of
complex life-support systems capable of maintaining an individual's
bodily functions for prolonged and indefinite periods of time, the
right to refuse treatment became synonymous with the "right to
die.""3
Ultimately, the right to die gained such overwhelming support
that many courts came to regard it as an aspect of the constitutionally protected right of privacy.' 4 Although the United States Supreme Court has rejected this notion,'5 the Court recently "as11. Id.
12. E.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (extending common
law right of self-determination and informed consent to enable patient to refuse
treatment).
13. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851
(1990).
14. The concept of a constitutional right of privacy was first introduced by the
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In finding a constitutional right to use contraceptives in the course of marital relations, the Griswold
Court opened the door to broader constitutional protection for individual privacy. In
particular, the Court explained that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Id. at 484 (citation omitted).
Since Griswold, the Court has found many intimate activities, most notably the decision to abort a human fetus, to be protected within these constitutional "zones of
privacy." See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird,.
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception in general); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (communication); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage).
Before the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), several prominent courts found these
zones to be "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions." In
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); accord
Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 585 (D.R.I. 1988); Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). But cf. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (resting decision entirely on common law
grounds without addressing constitutional arguments). This extension of constitutional privacy rights also received scholarly approval. See, eg., Comment, The Right
to Die-A Current Look, 30 Lov. L. REV. 139, 147 (1984) (footnote omitted) ("Extension to include a limited right to die does not appear to be unwarranted.").
15. Just last Term, the Court emphasized that "[a]lthough many state courts
have held that a right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never so held." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 n.7 (1990) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
194-95 (1986)). Without elaborating, the Court apparently adopted the constitutional
analysis provided by the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d
408, 418 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). There, the Missouri court refused to stretch the penumbral zones of privacy first discussed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), observing that the Supreme Court has strictly limited the constitutional right
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sume[d] that the United States Constitution would grant a
competent person a constitutionally protected [due process] right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.""' In Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health,'17 the first Supreme Court case to
address the "right to die," eight justices embraced "[t]he principle
that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment."' 8 Despite this overwhelming support, the five-justice majority refused to give incompetent patients the same protection and left states free to provide
whatever protection they deem appropriate."
Fortunately for these patients, most state courts have recognized a common law right to refuse or to discontinue artificial lifesupport. 0 Considering the need for such protection, many commentators have praised the application of longstanding common law
principles to this new technology as an illustration of our judicial
system at its best. According to Professor Charles Baron,
[An] enormously important benefit [of our judicial system] is the opportunity which court decision making provides for the gradual development of a body of common law principles, based in societal values,
that can be used for deciding fundamental questions with which a
"new technology" is now challenging our society. The ability of AngloAmerican court systems to develop principles for what appear to be
radically new problems on the basis of established principles reflecting
of privacy to matters. of marriage and procreation. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 418 (citing
Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (constitutional privacy right does not extend to homosexual conduct)).
16. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990).
17. Id.
18. Id. In fact, in this five to four decision, which produced no less than five
separate opinions, only Justice Scalia rejected this general principle. See id. at 2859
(Scalia, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 2852. The Court distinguished between competent and incompetent
patients by observing that "an incompetent person is not able to make an informed
and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other
right." Id. By declining to provide constitutional protection for incompetent patients,
the Court refused to invalidate procedural restrictions on the withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment. Thus, the Court "conclude[d] that a State may apply a clear and
convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue
nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state."
Id. at 2854. In Cruzan, this heightened evidentiary standard, imposed by the Missouri Supreme Court, prevented the parents of a permanently comatose accident victim from obtaining a court order to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration for
their daughter despite strong evidence that she would not want to live under such
conditions. Id. at 2874 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("She said 'several times' that
'she wouldn't want to live that way ....
").
20. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) ("Nearly
unanimously, those courts have found a way to allow persons wishing to die . . . to
meet the end sought."); see, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
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court-developed societal responses to problems in analogous areas is
an article of faith of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 1
Not only do these principles represent an "article of faith" in
our judicial system, they are often the only hope for incapacitated
patients wishing to refuse. or to discontinue treatment. Over the
years, judicial decisions have developed a method of analysis
designed to preserve the rights of those patients who lack the capacity to exercise them personally.2 2 This method, known as "substituted judgment," enables courts to effectuate the desires of incapacitated patients in three different ways.23 First, where the patient
clearly expressed her desires when competent, courts will generally
honor these wishes in the event of incompetency.24 Second, if the
patient had not explicitly indicated her wishes regarding the continuation or withdrawal of life-support, but close friends or relatives
can testify to the patient's overall philosophy and likely decision,
courts may render a decision in accordance with this evidence.2 5
Third, where there is no substantial evidence of the patient's preferences, courts examine the patient's '"best interests" in rendering a
2
decision.
Through these approaches, courts have helped to guarantee that
the patient's right to refuse or to discontinue life-prolonging treat21. Baron, Medical Paternalismand the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Relman,
4 Am.J.L. & MED. 337, 353 (1979) (footnote omitted); see Note, Decisionmaking for
the Incompetent Terminally Ill Patient: A Compromise in a Solution Eliminates a
Compromise of Patients' Rights, 57 IND. L.J. 325, 340 (1982).
22. Note, supra note 21, at 347.
23. Oberman, Withdrawal of Life Support: Individual Autonomy Against Alleged State Interests in PreservingLife, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 797, 811 (1989) (footnote
omitted); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1368-69 (2d ed. 1988).
24. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985); In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363; 376-80, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-74 (1981).
25. See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 131-32, 660 P.2d 738, 748 (1983).
26. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 363-68, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-33 (1985); see also In
re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d
810, 820, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1984). "The advantage of best interests analysis is that
it does not require any evidence of the patient's desires, given a certain set of circumstances .... Factors to consider in a best interests analysis are the prognosis, the
burdens upon the patient and the quality and duration of the sustained life." Note,
Withdrawal of Nutrition and Hydration from Incompetent Patients in Missouri, 54
Mo. L. REV. 713, 725 (1989) (footnotes omitted) (citing Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154
Ariz. 207, 221-22, 741 P.2d 674, 688-89 (1987)).
While the second and third approaches discussed above may properly be called
"substituted judgment," some commentators only use this term to describe the second approach and take pains to distinguish it from a "best interests" analysis. According to these commentators, "Substituted judgment decisionmaking has developed
as an alternative proxy decisionmaking standard to the bests [sic] interests approach." Student Forum: The Role of the Judiciaryand the Legislature in Decisionmaking on Behalf of Incompetents, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 1167, 1171 n.24. In contrast to
the "best interests" approach, this "standard takes into account factors aside from
the ward's best interests, such as the interests of third parties especially close relations." Id.
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ment "not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice." 27 Stated differently,
courts have applied the doctrine of substituted judgment to ensure
that the disease which has destroyed the patient's decisionmaking
capacity not also be permitted to destroy her rights.2 By adopting a
method of analysis which focuses on the interests, desires and preferences of the individual, courts have provided incompetent patients
with the same rights as those held by competent patients.29 "The
need to preserve a person's rights has thus properly been viewed by
the courts to be of paramount concern in the step-by-step decision
of when to terminate treatment.""0
Without proposing any substitute for substituted judgment,
Judge Peccarelli complains that this "legal fiction" may not accurately assess the wishes of incompetent patients and he repeatedly
cites it as an example of unwarranted judicial activism. 1 Yet, while
substituted judgment is indeed a "legal fiction," it could hardly be
described as a fairy tale. Little imagination is needed to conclude
that patients would make decisions consistent with previously expressed desires, their own best interests-, or the conduct and philosophy exhibited throughout their lifetimes. Furthermore, courts employing this standard prudently solicit the input of close friends and
family members capable of providing concrete guidance on the patient's probable decision. 2 Thus, far from being a ludicrous legal fic27. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
28. See Oberman, supra note 23, at 798 (footnote omitted) ("an individual
should not lose the privacy or autonomy rights of a competent person upon becoming
incompetent."); Note, supra note 21, at 334 (footnote omitted) (incompetency alone
should not deprive an individual of rights).
29. "The trend in the law has been to give incompetent persons the same rights
as other individuals." Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 747, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (1977). Unfortunately, the first Supreme Court
case to address the right to die departed from this trend. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 n.12 (1990), the Court refused to provide
incompetent patients with the same constitutional rights as those given to competent
patients. Apparently, the Court believed it futile to provide the former with constitutional rights that they cannot exercise personally. See id. at 2852. However, because
Cruzan only decided the extent of constitutional protection, it does not overrule a
substituted judgment analysis that treats both classes of patients equally under state
law.
30. Note, supra note 21, at 335.
31. Peccarelli, supra note 1, at 538, 547-48, 566.
32. Indeed, many scholars believe that family input is not only helpful, but indispensable in deciding whether to terminate life support. In Professor Ira Ellman's
opinion,
the family should make medical care decisions for an incapacitated patient because they are the decisionmakers most likely to render a decision faithful to
the patient's probable desires . . . . As a matter of policy, letting the family
decide in these cases usually makes sense; for one thing, we probably have few
-better alternatives.
Ellman, supra note 4, at 399 (footnote omitted). See Rhoden, Litigating Life and
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tion, substituted judgment represents a deliberative, reasoned
method of determining patients' wishes and of honoring these
desires.
. Although "there will always be some residual doubt that the decision made in fact expresses what the patient would have wanted
done,""3 there is no doubt that courts must develop objective, rational criteria for making such decisions. According to Professor
Lawrence Tribe,
Given that a decision must be made, and that continuing treatment
for a patient who would have wanted treatment stopped may be as
unfortunate as discontinuing treatment for a patient who-would have
wanted treatment continued, courts may have no choice but to formulate "objective" criteria for these treatment decisions.3
While this type of judicial decisionmaking is essential in preserving patients' rights, Judge Peccarelli's recommendations would
subvert and destroy these rights. By vigorously opposing judicial intervention, and by refusing to decide these cases without statutory
guidelines, Judge Peccarelli would condemn all incapacitated patients to a lifetime of feeding tubes and other life-support systems
whether they would want it or not. In this way, Judge Peccarelli
trades whatever residual doubt exists in the substituted judgment
standard for the virtual certainty of error in all cases where incapacitated patients would exercise their right to die."5 Thus, although
substituted judgment may not be a perfect decisionmaking tool, it is
far superior to the type of judicial inactivity advocated by Judge
Peccarelli.
III.

JUDICIAL vs. LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION

ironically, despite his open distrust for judicial decisionmaking
in this area, Judge Peccarelli would shift decisionmaking power to a
body of politicians whose concerns lie more with political constituents than with incapacitated patients. Rather than improve the
quality of such decisionmaking, removing life and death decisions
from the judicial branch would deprive patients of vital protections
that only courts can provide.
Though Judge Peccarelli suggests otherwise, the judicial process, with a substituted judgment standard designed to preserve paDeath, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375, 438-45 (1988).
33. Tribe, supra note 23, at 1369 (footnote omitted).
34. Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. "An erroneous decision not to terminate life-support ... robs a patient of
the very qualities protected by the right to avoid unwanted medical treatment. His
own degraded existence is perpetuated; his family's suffering is protracted; the memory he leaves behind becomes more and more distorted." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2873 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tients' rights, undoubtedly offers decisionmaking preferable to that
which is not shrouded in the procedural protections and safeguards
of the adversary system.36 Unfortunately, Judge Peccarelli overlooks
"the importance of guaranteeing to such decisions the special qualities of process which characterize decision making by courts. '37 As
one jurist observed, "such questions of life and death . . .require
the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision
that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was
created."3
While the adversary system has its critics, the competition that
it generates among lawyers is quite healthy where questions of life
and death are concerned. After hearing two competing advocates argue vigorously both for and against the continuation of treatment,
judges are in the best position to weigh all of the complex legal and
factual considerations that must be evaluated in rendering a just decision. 9 Moreover, the battle among competing lawyers in adversarial proceedings helps to "ensure that all viewpoints and alternatives will be aggressively pursued and examined."40 Indeed,
36. As one student commentator has observed, judicial intervention offers several important advantages in making these difficult life and death decisions:
Judicialization . . . provides a forum for answering the difficult question involved in decisionmaking and offers a method to assert an incompetent patient's rights. The substitute judgment test used by the court is a means for
weighing different considerations involved in each factual situation and for upholding a patient's rights in the best possible manner. The judicial system can
also provide continuing guidelines over time.
Note, supra note 21, at 347.
37. Baron, supra note 21, at 337.
38. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
759, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977).
39. As Professor Charles Baron has noted, excellent advocates are essential to
excellent decisionmaking:
It is certainly the two contending advocates who are in the best position to
make sure that all critical aspects of their case are brought into the public eye.
It is they who also have the major responsibility for supplying the judge with
all of the favorable legal sources and arguments he can use to write his opinion,
on the one hand, or with facing the judge with all of the contradicting legal
sources and arguments that he must explain away, on the other. And it is they
who are responsible for making sure that all and only relevant evidence comes
before the trier of fact . . . .It is they who must in fact carry the burden of
fully developing the evidence and arguments in the case, and it is they who are
in the best position to make sure that any given judge stays true to the principles of the judicial process . ...
Baron, supra note 21, at 349.
40. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 757, 370 N.E.2d at 433. A majority of the Supreme
Court has expressed concern "that a judicial proceeding to make a determination regarding an incompetent's wishes may very well not be an adversarial one, with the
added guarantee of accurate factfinding that the adversary process brings with it."
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1990) (footnote
omitted). Yet, where proceedings lack a sufficiently adversarial quality, courts may
alleviate this concern by appointing guardians ad litem:
Indeed, any concern that those who come forward will present a one-sided view
would be . . .addressed by appointing a guardian ad litem, who could use the
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adversarial court proceedings provide an ideal focal point for collective decisionmaking which incorporates the views of family, friends,
physicians, clergy and other interested members of society.' In this
manner, courts may "provide a forum where different groups are
able to coordinate their concerns and their input of information."4' 2
Not only does the judicial process ensure that all relevant information is considered, it helps to eliminate irrelevant considerations.
Through strict rules of evidence, courts exclude irrelevant or prejudicial information that may compromise patients' rights. In accordance with the substituted judgment standard used in most states,
courts usually limit the evidence to patients' preferences and interests and "provide the ultimate safeguard against those who might
not have the patient's best interests at heart."4 Thus, courts can
protect incapacitated patients from those who would pull the plug in
order to spare the expense or inconvenience of treating them."
Occasionally, courts. must use this power to protect patients
from their own families. Despite their good intentions, family members undergoing the ordeal of watching their loved ones die face a
host of pressures that may conflict with patients' interests. Beyond
the tremendous financial strain of mounting hospital bills, prolonging the patient's life increases the emotional price that relatives pay.
The financial and emotional resources devoted to the patient also
deplete their ability to meet other personal and family obligations.
These burdens, and the continuous agony of confronting a loved one
ravaged by disease, would end with the patient's death. For these
reasons, family members may opt to discontinue treatment even if
this would conflict with the patient's best interests or desires. Conversely, the emotional ties of family members may make them more
reluctant than the incapacitated patient to accept death, and they
may request heroic measures even where the patient herself would
not. "In short, the family's intimate involvement is at once both a
State's powers of discovery to gather and present evidence regarding the patient's wishes. A guardian ad litem's task is to uncover any conflicts of interest
and ensure that each party likely to have relevant evidence is consulted and
brought forward-for example, other members of the family, friends, clergy,
and doctors.
Id. at 2872 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
41. Despite Judge Peccarelli's assertion that judicial intervention removes this
decision from society, the adversary system actually "provide[s] the ideal focal point
for society's participation in this most crucial decision." Comment, The Problem of
Prolonged Death: Who Should Decide?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 169, 173 (1975). Through
their testimony, individuals from all walks of life may shed light on the ultimate decision and contribute significantly to the court's resolution.
42. Note, supra note 21, at 341 (footnote omitted).
43. Comment, supra note 41, at 173.
44. In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill.2d 33, 65, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (1989)
("court intervention is necessary to guard against the remote, yet real possibility that
greed may taint the judgment of the surrogate decisionmaker.").
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powerful reason they are entitled to be heard and a powerful reason
they may not be motivated solely by the patient's best interests.""'
Thus, even where families are involved, courts must intervene to exclude these improper motives and to preserve the integrity of the
decisionmaking process.
In a very real sense, integrity is a central component of our judicial system and a compelling reason for keeping life and death decisions in the capable hands of judges. Perhaps the most important
benefit provided by the judiciary is its "fundamental commitment to
a public system of principled decision making.""' It is not enough
for judges merely to render decisions, they must support them with
sound legal principles and a thorough analysis of the evidence. If
judges fail to properly justify their decisions, they face reversal by
appellate courts who may scrutinize every inch of their opinions for
accuracy and persuasiveness.4 7 More importantly, judges who render
faulty decisions must endure the exacting scrutiny of the public at
large. In addition to unfavorable press coverage, their written opinions are "always available for study and trenchant criticism in legal
treatises, in law reviews, and, perhaps most important, in law school
classrooms. Many a judicial reputation has been made or broken in
'case method' classes which employ judicial opinions as grist for
their pedagogical mill."' 8 Yet, while judges render their decisions
with the knowledge that they may be publicly reviewed, members of
the judiciary are largely insulated from political forces that may inhibit impartial, principled decisionmaking in controversial areas.' 9
Just the opposite is true of the legislators that Judge Peccarelli
would defer to. Rather than exhibit a fundamental commitment to a
system of principled decisionmaking, these politicians usually display a fundamental commitment to re-election. Unlike the judicial
system, the legislative process does not involve a method of "detached but passionate investigation and decision."5 0 Although many
groups may testify before legislative committees, the legislature has
45. Ellman, supra note 4, at 400; see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990) ("[T]here is no automatic assurance that the
view of close family members will necessarily be the same as the patient's would have
been had she been confronted with the prospect of her situation while competent.");
Comment, supra note 41, at 172 (safeguards in addition to family affection needed).
46. Baron, supra note 21, at 349.
47. "Backstopping the effort to work principle out of court decisions is a system
of appellate courts which reviews the conclusions of law articulated by lower courts,
to make sure that principles are developed consistently and in the proper direction."
Id. at 348.
48. Id. at 347.
49. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1281, 1307 (1976) ("His professional tradition insulates him from narrow political pressures.").
50. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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no mechanism for excluding irrelevant or prejudicial factors from
consideration. Political deals and other considerations having nothing whatever to do with patients' welfare may shape and control legislative action. Quite often, legislators are more concerned with satisfying special interest groups than with addressing the interests of
incapacitated patients." Without any requirement that legislators
articulate sound reasons for their actions, there are few procedures
for ensuring the integrity of their decisionmaking.
While the legislature may nonetheless provide an effective political check on the errant decisions of judges, legislation designed to
eliminate judicial intervention would destroy equally vital safeguards.5" Though legislation has been proposed to place life and
death decisions in the hands of such third parties as physicians and
family members, 53 these statutes would leave incapacitated patients
at the mercy of those whose interests, may conflict with their own. 4
Only a court that has carefully weighed the evidence in the course of
a principled, adversarial proceeding can adequately protect these
patients from improper considerations which might otherwise affect
these crucial decisions. Without any judicial review of these decisions, patients cannot be assured that their treatment, and, in reality, their lives, will only be terminated in accordance with their best
interests or desires. 55
51. "Although legislatures may be the repository of the collective will, historically, legislative action has been somewhat ineffective in creating and protecting mentally disabled persons' rights. Traditionally, the mentally incompetent have not displayed the political power necessary to advance their interests." Student Forum,
supra note 26, at 1169.
52. Professor Abram Chayes has observed that the judicial process provides a
more effective means of problem solving than does the legislature:
Unlike an administrative bureaucracy or a legislature, the judiciary must respond to the complaints of the aggrieved. It is also rather well situated to perform the task of balancing the importance of competing policy interests in a
specific situation. The legislature, perhaps, could balance, but it cannot address specific situations.
Chayes, supra note 49, at 1308 (emphasis in original).
53. See, e.g., Health Care Consent Act, Ill. S.B. 1887, 86th General Assembly
(Apr. 5, 1990); Decisions to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment Act, Ill. S.B. 2213,
86th General Assembly(Apr. 6, 1990). The full text of both of these statutes is provided in Judge Peccarelli's article. See Peccarelli, supra note 1, at 549 n.52. The Illinois House Judiciary I Committee voted to reject the Decisions to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment Act, Ill. S.B. 2213. See Wagner and Pearson, House Panel Kills A
Right-To-Die Bill, Chicago Tribune, June 7, 1990, at 1, col. 1; Phone Interview with
Bette Pree, Computer Analyst, Illinois Legislative Information Service (Oct. 4, 1990).
54. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
55. As Professor Charles Kindregan has stated, third parties cannot conduct the
type of searching examination expected of the judiciary:
A searching examination by an impartial arbiter seems to be required in order
to determine whether essential medical treatment should be withheld from an
incompetent patient. The lack of such an examination is the fundamental defect of proposals to allow the family, a guardian, physicians, or a medical institution to make the decision to withhold life-supporting treatment for incompe-
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Not only would these statutes deprive patients of important judicial safeguards, they would also deprive surrogate decisionmakers
of the type of civil and criminal immunity that only courts can provide." While these statutes purport to immunize those who withhold treatment according to their provisions, they offer inadequate
protection for those who apply these provisions incorrectly. 57 Even
the remote chance of being held liable for a patient's death would
undoubtedly deter many persons from interpreting these statutes
themselves. To avoid this risk, these laymen will likely turn to the
courts for more reliable statutory interpretations and the immunity
that comes with them." Thus, no matter whom the decisionmaking
baton is passed to, they will probably pass it right back into the
steady hands of judges."
Although Judge Peccarelli complains that "[jiudicial intervention results in the overlaying of the moral principles of an individual
judge . . .upon the right of individuals to make their own decisions," 60 he is more than willing to accept the moral views of a body
of politicians."' Yet, in urging legislators to codify the moral views of
tent persons.
Kindregan, supra note 5, at 931.
56. "The court is not chosen as the forum because judges are wiser than other
men. Rather, the court is the forum because only the judge can provide civil and
criminal immunity to the person who withholds treatment." Id. at 919-20.
57. For example, the Decisions to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment Act, Ill.
S.B. 2213, 86th General Assembly (Apr. 6, 1990) would provide, inter alia, that "[n]o
person shall be subject to any criminal prosecution for making a decision to forego or
not to forego life-sustaining treatment in good faith on behalf of a patient who lacks
decisional capacity in accordance with this Act." Id. at § 8(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Health Care Consent Act, Ill. S.B. 1887, 86th General Assembly (Apr. 5,
1990), would provide, inter alia, that "[n]o physician ... shall be subject to any
criminal prosecution or be deemed to have engaged in unprofessional conduct for
carrying out in good faith and in accordance with this Act and reasonable medical
standards a decision to forego or not to forego life-sustaining treatment." Id. at § 8(a)
(emphasis added). By conditioning immunity on compliance with these acts, these
provisions leave open the possibility of litigation on the propriety of surrogate decisionmakers' or physicians' actions. Hence, while these immunity provisions may create strong defenses, they do not eliminate the danger of personal liability as effectively as a decision approved by the court.
58. To confirm their authority to terminate life-support, these individuals may
use the declaratory judgment procedure available in virtually all state and federal
courts. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 57; Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
2201, 2202 (1988).
59. Rather than pass statutes eliminating judicial intervention, legislators can
help to improve the quality of decisionmaking by encouraging individuals to make
their wishes known. "To assist the courts, all competent persons must be encouraged
to make known their wishes regarding life-support and other medical treatment in
the event of future incompetency. This would require a far greater legislative effort
than that seen in this area to date." Oberman, supra note 23, at 817 (footnote omitted). In particular, legislators must approve laws which promote the execution of living wills and which give patients the opportunity to make other written declarations
regarding life-support in advance of disability. Id.
60. Peccarelli, supra note 1, at 547.
61. Id. at 561-66.
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society, Judge Peccarelli fails to explain adequately how these views
pertain to the plight of an incapacitated patient. In truth, legislators
should not be permitted to legislate morality any more than judges
should. Neither group, nor anyone else in society, has the right to
impose its own moral views upon incapacitated patients. To the extent that moral views may be considered at all, the views of the patient alone must be examined. Indeed, the risk that legislators will
impose their own views on such patients is a strong argument
against legislative action and a potent reason for using the principled decisionmaking process of the judiciary to keep the inquiry
where it belongs-on the views and interests of patients
themselves. 2
IV. CONCLUSION
While Judge Peccarelli repeatedly denies it, his brethren have
made excellent contributions to the quality of life and death decisions. Not only did the judiciary create the right to die by applying
established common law principles to the perplexing questions
raised by new medical technology, it has answered these questions
through a method of analysis designed to preserve patients' rights
and to honor their wishes. To further ensure the integrity and accuracy of this process, judges have rendered these decisions in the
course of principled, adversarial proceedings which examine all relevant factors and which exclude improper considerations.
Despite the benefits of judicial intervention, Judge Peccarelli
would deprive incapacitated patients of these fundamental safeguards. Indeed, by refusing to intervene in advance of legislative action, Judge Peccarelli would leave these patients in a legal state as
irreversible as their comas. "While it is understandable that judges
are uncomfortable determining if life under certain conditions is actually worse than death, a great injustice is done to the incompetent
patient by avoiding the question."6 3 Rather than improve the decisionmaking process, shifting this question to the legislature may cast
patients' lives into an uncertain political arena in which the moral
views of politicians and their constituents take precedence over the
interests and desires of patients themselves.
Beyond the harm to patients, judges who refuse to face these
problems do a great disservice to society. Having accepted positions
62. "[Tlhe job of deciding such life and death questions is the responsibility of
the court system 'and is not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent the "morality and conscience of our society," no matter how highly motivated
or impressively constituted.'" Baron, supra note 21, at 337-38 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 732, 370 N.E.2d 417,
438 (1977).
63. Oberman, supra note 23, at 818.
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that often require them to make the most difficult decisions known
to man, Judge Peccarelli and his brethren have assumed an obligation to confront these awesome tasks."' Society has always relied on
members of the judiciary to make the toughest decisions in life and,
in this case, about life." Shifting this responsibility to the legislature would thus neglect one of the most important societal functions
of the judicial branch. Yet, as Judge Peccarelli himself admits, "Frequently the persons or entities who have the responsibility for making the decision abdicate their responsibility."6 This is precisely
what Judge Peccarelli has done in his article.

64. Peccarelli, supra note 1, at 567 ("it is the judiciary to whom an appeal is
made to resolve issues which others are unwilling or unable to resolve.").
65. See Comment, supra note 41, at 172 ("Society already looks to the courts as
arbitrators of questions of fact, even those with great moral ramifications.").
66. Peccarelli, supra note 1, at 567.

